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ABSTRACT Cognitive radio (CR) has been introduced to accommodate the steady increment in the spectrum
demand. Wireless security in CR network (CRN) is a challenging technical area due to the dynamic and
unique characteristics of CRNs. As a cognitive node can dynamically join or leave the spectrum, providing
secure communication becomes problematic and requires more investigation. Authentication is a primary
security property in wireless networks, wherein the identity of a cognitive node is verified before providing
access to available resources. In this paper, a two-level authentication scheme for communication in a CRN
is proposed. Before joining the network, a CR node is validated by obtaining security credentials from an
authorized point. The proposed scheme relies on public- and symmetric-key cryptography, instead of using
a digital signature-based approach. It encrypts data between the communicating nodes in order to improve
network security in terms of resource availability and accessibility. This mitigates attacks such as reflection
attack, denial of service attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. The scheme has been evaluated and verified
in terms of security functionality, its correctness, and the performance, which shows less computation and
communication requirements.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, cognitive radio, security, symmetric key, cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, cognitive radio (CR) has become one of the most
commonly studied techniques in the field of wireless net-
works [1]. Currently, the conventional spectrummanagement
approach is widely applied by regulators all over the world,
wherein the regulators assign the spectrum frequency bands
locally to service providers for large geographical ranges
and for long periods of time. Then, each service provider
manages its frequency bands by defining its users, their rights,
and specifying the regulations that control the communica-
tion over its channels. Although these regulations intend to
enhance the spectrum usage, they can lead to a spectrum
scarcity problem. A service provider sells the spectrum in
the form of bandwidth to its end users, referred as primary
users (PUs) [2]. These PUs, which own the spectrum for a
long term, can resell their unused spectrum to other users
known as secondary users (SUs).
Cognitive radio networks differ from other wireless net-
works. Some reliability issues are unique to CRN, such as
its high sensitivity to weak primary signals, its unknown pri-
mary receiver location, its tight synchronization requirement
in centralized cognitive radio networks, and its lack of a
common control channel [3].
The radio technology itself is vulnerable to attacks, as any
radio frequency can be blocked or jammed if a transmitter
sends a signal at the same frequency with enough power.
As any other type of wireless networks, CRNs are vulnerable
to many security attacks [4], such as Denial of Service attack,
Man-in-the-Middle attack, and Reflection attack.
Unlicensed users can use the white bands of the spectrum
in the absence of licensed users. There is no control over
the behavior of these unlicensed users, which threatens the
security of the licensed users. A node can use the vulnerability
of CRN reliability and the absence of control to attack the
different layers of the communication protocol.
There are many concepts that should be applied to satisfy a
secure communication among CRNs, which are referred to as
security requirements: confidentiality, integrity, availability
and authentication [5].
Confidentiality serves to protect information in order to
prevent unauthorized access to the system and/or individu-
als information. Data confidentiality is an essential require-
ment in CRNs in order to protect the privacy of the data
owner’s (PU or SU) personal information including bank stor-
ing credit and balance information [6]. Moreover, since radio
is the communication medium in CRNs, which makes it open
for access and more vulnerable to attacks, confidentiality
should be guaranteed for each connection.
Integrity is the security requirement of ensuring that
information will not be accidentally or maliciously altered
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or destroyed. It means that data is transmitted from the source
to the destination without alteration [7]. The message can
only be altered by the sender without detection by other
nodes. Integrity protects against unauthorized data creation,
alteration or destruction. If a corrupted message is accepted,
then this would be detected as a violation of the integrity
property [8].
Availability allows the network users to use the network
for their own transmissions and to keep track of the traffic
over the network [6]. In CRN, when PUs are not using their
spectrum channels, other users (SUs) can use these channels.
However, once a PU wants to use its channels again, all SUs
have to leave immediately to make the channels available.
Authentication is the verification process of the claimed
identity of a user [9]. It is a primary security requirement since
the other requirements first require propoer authentication.
In CRN, each node has to authenticate itself before it can
use the available spectrum channels. One access point takes
care of the authentication process wherein all SUs identify
themselves to the access point.
In this paper, our main focus is the authentication process
in CRNs in order to ensure secure communication. As men-
tioned previously, the authentication process is considered
to be the primary security requirement in wireless networks.
The protocol scope is within CRNs as the cognitive capability
provides more dynamicity to the communicating nodes in the
network, which makes the authentication process easier to
implement. Moreover, we authenticate the users that do not
have a permession to access the network resources, which
differs from other networks that only authenticate and grant
licensed users access to the network resources. We propose
a two-level authentication scheme to validate the cognitive
node and its user. The scheme takes place on different lay-
ers (i.e. physical, data link, and network) to authenticate the
node, and on the application layer to authenticate the node’s
user. The proposed scheme aims to provide additional secu-
rity in CRN networks to ensure that the network resources
are available and permit access to these resources for authen-
ticated nodes only. Moreover, as the proposed authentication
scheme is completed over different layers, it would mitigate
different potential attacks such as a reflection attack, a denial
of service attack, and a man-in-the-middle attack.
The rest of this paper is organized into five more sections.
In Section II, a literature review is conducted. In Section III,
the authentication scheme will be explained. The proposed
model is evaluated and verified in detail in Section IV.
Section V presents the scheme’s performance evaluation
results that show the efficiency of the proposed model
compared to other models. Lastly, we conclude this paper
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Authentication process has been researched in all kinds of
wireless networks with different solutions proposed. In [10],
Wong et al. proposed a dynamic user authentication scheme
in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). It allows legitimate
users to request the sensor data from any of the sensor
nodes by imposing less computational load. This scheme
claimed that it is secure against replay and forgery attacks.
However, Tseng et al. in [11] proved that the scheme pro-
posed in [10] is vulnerable to replay and forgery attacks
and proposed an authentication mechanism to overcome the
drawbacks of [10]. Han et al. in [12] proposed a distributed
node authentication model wherein all the network nodes are
involved in the authentication process as an authenticator.
The main drawback of this scheme is the increased compu-
tational cost and communication overhead. Another authen-
tication scheme is proposed by Zhu et al. in [13], where
each node generates a one-way key chain and sends the
commitment of it to its neighbors. If a node wants to send
a message to its neighbors, it attaches the next authorization
key from its key chain to the message. The receiving node
can verify the validation of the key based on the commitment
it has already received. The main drawback of this scheme
is that it does not mitigate attacks from nodes which are
already part of the networ; since the adversary knows the
node’s authorization key. Ning et al. in [14] have proposed an
authentication scheme that uses one-way-key-chain to filter
false messages sent between the access point and the sensor
nodes. However, the main disadvantage of this scheme is that
it uses signature-based authentication, which requires syn-
chronization and periodic broadcasting between the access
points and the sensor nodes.
Tan et al. in [15] proposed an approach to strengthen the
accuracy of the spectrum sensing process, in which each
primary user has to add its unique signature to its signal.
No node can emulate a PU during the sensing process,
as it cannot provide the PU’s signature, and therefore the
PUE attack is mitigated. Furthermore, the authors claim
that the authentication cannot be done on layers other than
the physical layer as nodes might not deploy similar proto-
cols at higher layers and therefore, the authentication mes-
sages would not be understood. However, in CRN, nodes
are capable of understanding messages on different layers
as they run similar software, which can translate messages
in a way that each node can understand it. Kim in [16]
proposed an authentication scheme that uses the node’s loca-
tion information as a key factor to authenticate the cogni-
tive nodes by a base station. However, it cannot be applied
without the integration of the extensible authentication
protocol (EAP).
Parvin et al. in [17]–[19] have proposed a digital signature-
based authentication scheme, which takes place on the phys-
ical and data link layers, to find and permit the trusted users
existing in CRNs to access the spectrum. Despite the impor-
tance of this work to secure the communication in CRN, its
performance evaluation shows that the message transfer with
a digital signature takes a long time in comparison to a normal
message transfer without a digital signature. In [20] a mutual
authentication protocol based on a timestamp in Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs), which generates a new session key
for each session, is proposed.
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There are many limitations in previous authentication
approaches. First, at they take a long time to complete the
authentication process. Second, they rely on digital signature
cryptography and more messages are transferred during the
authentication process. Last, the other approaches focused
more on authenticating the spectrum usage and/or the joining
node. Our proposed authentication scheme differs from other
authentication schemes proposed in the literature in many
aspects, as following:
• It is a two-level authentication, wherein the authenti-
cation process is done by two different entities (fusion
center (FC) and cluster head (CH) defined later
in Section III) consecutively, and the joining node can
gain access to the network resources only after it has
been verified by both the entities.
• It utilizes the advantages of public and symmetric
key cryptography approaches to encrypt messages sent
between the joining node and the authenticating enti-
ties (both FC and CH), while other schemes apply the
digital signature-based approach which requires syn-
chronization and periodic broadcasting that takes a
longer execution time.
• It authenticates the spectrum usage and the joining node
in addetion to the user. Other authentication schemes
focused more on authenticating the spectrum usage
and/or the joining node; however, the user of the joining
node needs also to be authenticated to ensure whether it
is a legitimate user.
• The authentication process in our proposed scheme is
carried over different layers (physical, data link, net-
work, and application), while the other authentication
schemes are done on the physical and data link layers
only. Authentication on different layers strengthens the
authentication process.
• It mitigates different attacks that target the different
layers such as the reflection attack, the denial of service
attack, and the man-in-the-middle attack, which can
occur after the spectrum sensing phase is done. While
other authentication schemes focus more on mitigating
the Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack only, which
takes place during the spectrum sensing phase.
• It is specific to CRNs, as an attacker (misbehaving SU)
may emulate a primary user’s signal to lure other sec-
ondary users. Therefore, a secure authentication algo-
rithm is needed that can determine if a signal sent over
the network is a primary user’s signal or an attacker’s
signal. A unique challenge in addressing this problem
is that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
prohibits authentication or any modification to pri-
mary users after they buy the spectrum license [21].
Consequently, existing cryptographic techniques cannot
be used directly.
We verify the correctness of our proposed authentication
scheme by using two different formal verification methods.
The first method is Burrows, Abadi, and Needham (BAN)
logic [22], which is a formal logic technique that is
generally applied to judge protocols and encryption models.
It is designed specifically for authentication protocols to
prove that a protocol can reach its expected goals and has
many advantages such as its simplicity and ease of use. These
characteristics make it a good choice to verify our proposed
authentication scheme. The second method is an automated
validation tool namely Scyther [23] that shows how safe the
proposed scheme is from potential well-known attacks. It is a
tool for the formal analysis of security protocols. It provides
an explicit, modular, and formal language to express proto-
cols and their security features [23].
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, our two-level secure authentication scheme is
explained. It is based on public and symmetric key cryptog-
raphy, which reduces the number of cryptographic operations
and the authentication time needed to complete the authenti-
cation process.
FIGURE 1. System model.
A. PREFACE
Figure 1 illustrates our system, which is a network that has
M SUs divided into K different clusters based on their geo-
graphical locations wherein each cluster has a unique iden-
tifier (Cluster ID) within the network. A Fusion Center (FC)
controls the traffic over the network. In each cluster, one node
is chosen by the FC as a cluster head (CH). Any secondary
user that wants to join the network has to be authenticated
before it can use the network. Authentication is the process
of validating the identity of the new or returning node(s)
to the network. The joining node has to pass through the
authentication process at the fusion center level and at the
cluster head level.
In order to guarantee security in CRNs, we utilize two
differentmethodologieswhich are: public-key-infrastructure-
based and symmetric-key cryptography. To make the com-
munication of the current nodes secure, we propose that the
communication between the network nodes is completed by
utilizing the public-key cryptography. This will secure the
communication until a symmetric key is shared among the
communicating nodes, which is used to encrypt and decrypt
messages onwards. Symmetric-key cryptography has many
advantages that make it a good choice to use, such as its
straightforwardness, its less memory occupation, its less
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memory use, and its less power utilization. The symmetric
key will be assigned to each node during the authentication
process. Each node uses the same symmetric key for encod-
ing and decoding the messages after it is shared amongst
themselves. When a node sends a message to another node
in the network, this message will be encrypted with the sym-
metric key. Meanwhile, the receiver decrypts this message by
using the same symmetric key.
FIGURE 2. The sequence diagram of the proposed scheme.
B. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
The proposed authentication scheme aims to authenticate the
node (device) and its user as well as the spectrum usage.
It works at two different levels, which are the FC’s level and
the CH’s level. The joining node has to correctly pass over the
proposed two levels of authentication in order to be admitted
as a part of the CRN. The message sequence of the proposed
authentication scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.We define the
terms that will be used in our proposed authentication model
as follows:
• X: represents one of the system entities which are FC,
CH, or SU.
• Cert.(Manf(X)): the manufacturer’s certificate of
entity X.
• PKX : the public key of entity X.
• IDX : the logical identifier of entity X.
• MACX : the hardware address of entity X.
• Cert.(SU): the manufacturing certificate of entity SU,
which contains IDX , MACSU , and PKSU .
• Cert.(FC): the manufacturing certificate of entity FC,
which contains IDFC , MACFC , and PKFC .
• ENC(Info.): all info. is encrypted before sending it.
• R: a random number (Nonce) generated by the sender
and sent with each message to track the messages and to
correlate with their response messages.
• CID: connection ID.
• Symmetric Key: a key used for encryption and decryp-
tion by the communicating nodes (FC, SU, and CH),
SK1 between the FC and SU, SK2 between SU and
the CH.
• Joining Code: generated by the FC. The joining code is
unique within the cluster and is known by the nodes of
the cluster. This joining code will be used to determine
if this joining node is known to other cluster nodes.
• Security Capabilities: the features or properties that a
node supports to make a secure communication with
other nodes such as encryption/decryption protocol,
message integrity code and key management cryptog-
raphy algorithm.
• Belief Level (BL): describes the level of reliability
of a node to participate in data transmission over the
network.
A node’s certificate is validated through a server node, S,
known to all the nodes. The server S grants a certificate
to each node after it has been manufactured. The node’s
certificate includes its logic identifier, its MAC address and
a pair of its public/private keys. As each node’s certificate is
signed by the server’s key, each node contacts the server S
to validate other nodes’ certificate(s). During the certificate
validation, each node gets all the node information from the
server S except the node’s private key which is not shared
with any other node in the network. After users’ certificates
have been validated, all messages exchanged between the
FC/CH and the joining node cannot be accessed by a listening
adversary as the receiving node can easily determine if the
received message was sent from an intruder or not, based on
the node’s ID and its public key.
TABLE 1. Questions to the joining node.
During the authentication process, the authenticating
node (i.e. FC or CH) asks the joining node up to three
different questions as shown in Table 1. Answering these
questions correctly by the joining node leads to the successful
authentication of this joining node. During the first level of
authentication, the FC asks the joining node Question 1 (Q1)
and Question 2 (Q2) to check what information this node has
about the joining cluster. If the joining node is a returning
node to the same cluster, it has to answer the two questions
correctly. However, if the node is a returning node, but to
a different cluster or the node is completely a new node, it
answers Q1 only. The FC keeps track of all joined nodes
by storing their MAC address in a database that is used to
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FIGURE 3. Flow chart for authentication at the FC level.
determine if a joining node is a new node or a returning node.
During the second level of authentication, the CH asks the
joining node all three questions as it should have the answers
to all these questions as long as it has correctly passed the
FC’s level of authentication.
Each SU performs spectrum sensing to determine if any
white spectrum channels are available for use. If yes, SU con-
tacts the cluster(s) nodes within its range, in order to get
their cluster IDs, which are required during the authentication
process.
1) FIRST LEVEL OF AUTHENTICATION AT FUSION CENTER
The FC’s authentication level starts by validating the nodes’
certificate wherein the certificates of the joining node and
the authenticating node are validated through the server S.
During the certificate validation, the joining node (SU) sends
its manufacturer certificate (Cert.(Manf (SU))) to the FC,
which accepts nodes from a predefined manufacturers’ list
to access the network. If this joining node is from a known
manufacturer, the FC replies to SU by sending its own
certificate (Cert.(FC)). Then, SU sends its own certificate
(Cert(SU)) as well as amessage (ENCPKFC ()), encryptedwith
PKFC , that contains its ID (IDSU ), its security capabilities,
a random number (Nonce) RSU , a connection ID (CID),
and its MAC address. A MAC address is used because it
is unique for each node at the authentication layer. The FC
sends a message (ENCPKSU ()), encrypted with PKSU , to the
joining SU, which contains its ID (IDFC ), symmetric key SK1
used to encrypt/decrypt the messages exchanged from now
on, a random nonce (RFC ) connected with the received RSU ,
and questions (Q1 and Q2). The purpose of these questions is
to ensure that this joining node has enough information about
the cluster(s) that it wants to join.
If the joining node is a new node or a returning node to a
different cluster, Q1 will be answered only by sending ANS1,
which includes all cluster(s) ID(s) that SU receives from
nodes within its range. However, if the joining node is a
returning node to the same cluster that it was part of during the
last connection time, it answers both Q1 and Q2 by sending
ANS1 and ANS2. If a returning node to the same cluster
fails to provide the FC with the joining code, it will not be
admitted. The joining SU replies to Q1 and Q2 by sending
ANS1 and ANS2 encrypted with the symmetric key SK1.
Upon the success of answering Q1 and Q2 (if applicable),
the resource negotiation phase starts, in which the joining
SU sends its QoS requirements to the FC. The FC takes
the responsibility of determining if the desired cluster can
provide the QoS requirements or not.
The negotiation phase ends with either an agreement or a
disagreement between the joining SU and the FC. If both
do not agree on resources, SU will not be joined. If both
of them agree on resources, the FC assigns an IP address
to this node, provides it with the cluster joining code, cal-
culates a value called belief level, and prepares the public
key of the CH, PKCH . The belief level describes the level
of reliability of this node to participate in data transmission
over the network. The public key of the CH is used in
the second level of authentication at the CH. The node’s IP
address, the node’s belief level, the cluster head’s public key,
and the cluster’s joining code are encrypted in one message
and sent to the joining node. Meanwhile, the FC sends the
node’s MAC address, the node’s belief level, and the node’s
public key PKSU to the CH. These parameters are sent in an
encrypted message, as the FC and the CH communicate over
a secure control channel. Figure 3 illustrates the flow chart of
the FC level authentication.
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FIGURE 4. Flow chart for authentication at the CH level.
2) SECOND LEVEL OF AUTHENTICATION AT CLUSTER HEAD
The joining SU starts the second level of authentication by
sending a message (ENCPKCH ()), encrypted with the already
known CH’s public key, to the cluster head. This encrypted
message contains the joining node’s public key PKSU ,
its MAC address, and a random number RSU . The CH
now wants to authenticate the user of this joining node by
asking three questions. First, the CH sends (ENCPKSU ()),
an encrypted message with the joining node’s public key.
In this messgae, CH asks the joining SU about the clus-
ter ID, and sends the symmetric key, SK2, that will be
used to encrypt/decrypt the messages from now on. The
joining SU replies by sending its answer encrypted with
the SK2.
If the joining SU answers correctly, the CH sends an
encrypted message with the SK2 asking the joining SU Q2
about the cluster’s joining code and Q3 about its BL. The
joining SU replies by sending its answers (ANS2 and ANS3)
encrypted with the SK2. If the joining SU answers correctly,
the CH admits the joining SU to be part of the cluster. The SU
can now join the cluster and can start transmitting data with
the other cluster nodes. If the joining node fails to answer any
of these three questions, it will not be admitted and the CH
sends a report to the FC. Figure 4 illustrates the flow chart of
the CH level authentication.
Each message sent between the joining node and the
authenticating node contains their random (nonce) numbers
which are used to synchronize messages and to prevent any
intruder from eavesdropping on the messages exchanged
between the communicating nodes. On the other hand, each
node’s ID is sent encrypted once the node sends its first
message to the other communicating party. The message
receiver validates the sender’s ID by extracting the sender’s
ID from the sender’s certificate sent earlier, and compares it
with the received one. This Validation prevents the messages
exchanged between the communicating nodes from being




We verify the correctness of our proposed authentication
scheme by using two different formal verification methods
which are BAN logic and Scyther verification tool.
1) VERIFICATION THROUGH BAN LOGIC
In BAN logic, all messages sent between the two commu-
nicating nodes are formulated according to the BAN logic
format and then BAN logic axioms and messages’ analysis
are applied to these messages to conclude if the protocol
meets its desired objectives or not.
The axioms used to prove the correctness of an authentica-
tion mechanism are as follows:
We assume that there are two network agents (P and Q),
a message (X ) is exchanged between the network agents.
Message (X ) is encrypted by an encryption key (K ). The
definitions and their implications are below:
• P believes X : P acts as if X is true, and may assert X in
other messages.
• P said X : At one time, P transmitted and believed mes-
sage X, although P might no longer believe X.
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• P sees X : P receives message X, and can read and
repeat X.
• fresh(X ): X has not previously been sent in anymessage.
We define the terms used through the verification process
in our authentication mechanism as follows:
• SU, FC, and CH: are the network agents.
• S: is a third party known to all nodes similar to service
provider base station.
• (Info.): is the message encrypted.
• PKFC : is the public key of entity FC.
• PKSU : is the public key of entity SU.
• PKCH : is the public key of entity CH.
• PKS : is the public key of the server S and known to SU
and FC which grants certificates to each node.
• IDFC : is the logical identifier of entity FC.
• IDSU : is the logical identifier of entity SU.
• IDCH : is the logical identifier of entity CH.
• RFC : is a random number (nonce) generated by FC.
• RSU : is a random number (nonce) generated by SU.
• SU SK1⇔ FC : is the symmetric key that SU and FC agree
during the FC level authentication
• SU SK2⇔ CH : is the symmetric key that SU and CH agree
during the CH level authentication
a: AUTHENTICATION AT FC LEVEL
We can represent the goals of the FC level authentication





Here are the idealized messages of the FC’s level authenti-
cation, note that we omit the messages and the parts of mes-
sages which do not affect the sender and receiver identities.
MSG1 : FC → SU : ENCPKS (MACFC PKFC−→ FC).
MSG2 : SU → FC : ENCPKS (MACSU PKSU−→ SU ),
ENCPKFC (IDSU ,RSU ,MACSU ).
MSG3 : FC → SU : ENCPKSU (IDFC ,RSU ,RFC ,Q1,
Q2, SU
SK1⇔ FC).
MSG4 : SU → FC : ENCSK1 (RFC ,ANS1,ANS2).









SU believesfresh (RSU )
FC believesfresh (RFC )
SU believes FC controls(SU
SK1⇔ FC)
FC believes FC controls(SU
SK1⇔ FC)
We apply the axioms of BAN logic on each message.
On message 1:
SU sees (MACFC ,
PKFC−→ FC) and SU believes PKS−→ S, there-
fore SU believes S said (MACFC ,
PKFC−→ FC). So, SU believes
S believes (MACFC ,
PKFC−→ FC), which means SU believes S
controls (MACFC ,
PKFC−→ FC), which results in SU believes
(MACFC ,
PKFC−→ FC).
For simplicity we consider the part that is related to the
public key cryptography, hence SU believes
PKFC−→ FC .
On message 2:
We start by considering the first part of message 2, which is
ENCPKS ((MACSU ,
PKSU−→ SU )). FC sees (MACSU , PKSU−→ SU )
and FC believes
PKS−→ S, therefore FC believes S
said (MACSU ,
PKSU−→ SU ). So, FC believes S believes
(MACSU ,
PKSU−→ SU ), which means FC believes S con-
trols (MACSU ,
PKSU−→ SU ), which results in FC believes
(MACSU ,
PKSU−→ SU ).
For simplicity we consider the part that is related to the
public key cryptography, hence FC believes
PKSU−→ SU .
We next consider the second part of message 2, which is
ENCPKFC (IDSU ,RSU ,MACSU ). The only deduction that we
obtain is FC sees (IDSU ,RSU ,MACSU ).
On message 3:
SU sees (IDFC ,RSU ,RFC ,Q1,Q2, SU
SK1⇔ FC), but
SU believes fresh (RSU ), therefore SU believes fresh
(IDFC ,RSU ,RFC ,Q1,Q2, SU
SK1⇔ FC). SU believes
PKFC−→ FC , and SU sees (IDFC ,RSU ,RFC ,Q1,Q2,
SU
SK1⇔ FC), therefore SU believes FC said (IDFC ,RSU ,
RFC ,Q1,Q2, SU
SK1⇔ FC). With the previous derivation we
conclude that SU believes FC believes (IDFC ,RSU ,RFC ,Q1,
Q2, SU
SK1⇔ FC), and with the assumption SU believes
FC controls (SU
SK1⇔ FC), we find that SU believes
(IDFC ,RSU ,RFC ,Q1,Q2, SU
SK1⇔ FC), which means SU
believes SU
SK1⇔ FC . (a)
On message 4:
FC sees (RFC ,ANS1,ANS2) and then compares the received
RFC with the sent RFC . If both are equal, it means FC ensures
that SU has received SK1.
Therefore, FC believes SU believes (SU
SK1⇔ FC), and with
the assumption FC believes FC controls (SU
SK1⇔ FC), we
find that FC believes (SU
SK1⇔ FC). (b)
Derivations (a) and (b) are the objectives of our proposed
authentication scheme on the FC’s level.
b: AUTHENTICATION AT CH LEVEL
The authentication on the CH’s level aims to validate the
identity of the SU, i.e. the CH ensures that the user of the
CR node is a legitimate user already authenticated by the FC
and has got the information needed. This authentication level
follows the question and answer method wherein the CH asks
the SU for some information and SU replies with the answers.
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Failing in answering any of these questions results in not
accepting the node in the network and a report will be sent
to the FC.
The messages exchanged between the CH and the SU are:
MSG1 : SU → CH : ENCPKCH (IDSU ,RSU ,MACSU ).
MSG2 : CH → SU : ENCPKSU (IDCH ,RSU ,RCH ,Q1,
SU
SK2⇔ CH ).
MSG3 : SU → CH : ENCSK2 (RCH ,RSU ,ANS1).
MSG4 : CH → SU : ENCSK2 (RSU ,RCH ,Q2,Q3).
MSG5 : SU → CH : ENCSK2 (RCH ,RSU ,ANS2,ANS3).






Note that CH encrypts question 1 in message 2 by the
public key of SU while question 2 and question 3 in messages
4 and 6 are encrypted with the symmetric key SK2 upon
the key agreement between the CH and SU that occurs in
message 3. Therefore to verify the correctness of this authen-
tication level, we need to apply BAN logic to the first three
messages only.







CH believesfresh (RSU )
FC believes fresh(RCH )
SU believes CH controls(SU
SK2⇔ CH )




PKSU−→ SU with the one received from the FC, and
if they are same, CH concludes that CH believes
PKSU−→ SU .
On message 2:
SU sees (IDCH ,RSU ,RCH ,Q1, SU
SK2⇔ CH ) but SU believes




PKCH−→ CH and SU sees (IDCH ,RSU ,RCH ,
Q1, SU
SK2⇔ CH ), therefore SU believes CH said
(IDCH ,RSU ,RCH ,Q1, SU
SK2⇔ CH ). With the previous
derivation we conclude that SU believes CH believes
(IDCH ,RSU ,RCH ,Q1, SU
SK2⇔ CH ), and with the assump-
tion SU believes CH controls (SU
SK2⇔ CH ), we find that SU
believes (IDCH ,RSU ,RCH ,Q1, SU
SK2⇔ CH ), which means
SU believes (SU
SK2⇔ CH ). (c)
On message 3:
CH sees (RCH ,RSU ,ANS1) and compares the received RCH
with the sent RCH . If both are equal, CH ensures that SU
has received SK2. Therefore, CH believes SU believes
(SU
SK2⇔ CH ), and with the assumption CH believes
CH controls (SU
SK2⇔ CH ) we find that CH believes
(SU
SK2⇔ CH ). (d)
Derivations (c) and (d) are the objectives of our proposed
authentication scheme on the CH’s level.
2) VERIFICATION THROUGH SCYTHER
We verified the vulnerability of the proposed authentication
mechanism to potential well-known attacks such as reflection
attack, man-in-the-middle attack and denial of service (DoS)
attack by using the Scyther verification tool. Figures 5 and 6
prove that our protocol is safe against them. These attacks are
analyzed in the following section and we show how they are
eliminated through our authentication mechanism.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We evaluated the proposed authentication scheme in terms
of its ability to prevent the attacks described in this section.
The proposed scheme is a secure scheme as long as it
disallows any malicious node from accessing the network.
In this section, we show the attacks that are prevented by
our authentication scheme. Moreover, we show the security
properties (requirements) that our two-level authentication
scheme fulfills.
1) AUTHENTICATION
As mentioned above, authentication is one of the security
requirements that a secure network has to fulfill. Our pro-
posed authentication scheme ensures that a node cannot
get access to network resources until it gets authenticated.
Moreover, applying a two level of authentication strengthens
the authentication process and reduces or even cancels the
opportunity for a malicious node to cheat the FC or the CH.
2) RESOURCE AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY
In the proposed scheme, network resources are only allocated
to authenticated nodes. Nodes that are not authenticated are
not allowed to access the resources; therefore, the resources
are available for authenticated nodes only. This enhances
network security and network performance.
3) REFLECTION ATTACK
It is an attack that targets any challenge-response authenti-
cation scheme wherein the attacker contacts a third party to
get a response to the authenticating node’s challenge. By our
proposed authentication scheme, random numbers (nonce)
are generated as a challenge to the joining node that has
to send its identifier with the received nonce, as well as its
own random number encrypted by its private key. The FC or
the CH, whichever is the authenticator, decrypts this message
and checks the random nonce number of the joining node.
If they do not match, the reflection attack is detected and
prevented. Therefore the reflection attack cannot be launched
with our authentication scheme.
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FIGURE 5. The results of executing the proposed authentication mechanism at FC level in the scyther
environment.
4) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
In this attack a malicious node accesses or invades the com-
munication between two parties. It impersonates both parties
and gains access to information that the two parties were try-
ing to send to each other. It allows a malicious actor to inter-
cept, send, and receive data meant for someone else, or not
meant to be sent at all, without either outside party knowing
until the action is completed. By our proposed authentica-
tion scheme, all messages between the joining node and the
authenticator (i.e. FC or CH) are encrypted by the receiver’s
public key or the symmetric key, which ensures that the only
one that can decrypt and understand the entire message is the
one that has the corresponding private key or the symmetric
key. Therefore, this attack can be easily detected and avoided
by our proposed authentication scheme.
5) DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK
A malicious node may eavesdrop on the communication
between two nodes and drop the messages exchanged
between the communicating nodes in order to reduce the
network performance. Another example of the DoS attack
is that a malicious node may inject the network with mean-
ingless messages, which influence other nodes’ performance.
By our proposed authentication, the FC only accepts authen-
tication requests from nodes that are already predefined in a
manufacture list. If a node that belongs to this list launches the
DoS attack, the FC will receive multiple requests from this
node in order to flood the network. Therefore, the FC quickly
and effectively identifies the incoming traffic as malicious.
Once the flood of traffic is identified as a DoS attack,
an effective response will be taken to absorb the attack, until
the source is identified and blocked. This response includes
releasing the assigned channels, setting its belief level value
to zero and notifying the cluster heads about this node in order
to prevent any node from communicating with this malicious
node.
V. SCHEME PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the performance overhead of our proposed
Authentication algorithm. Our algorithm has two stages
(at the FC or CH levels), five steps/each. In each stage,
the joining node and the authenticating party exchange their
first message using the other node’s public key (two mes-
sages), and the other messages are sent encrypted using the
symmetric key. By analyzing those messages, we find that
the authenticating party (FC or CH) sends two messages,
and the joining node sends three messages. As each joining
node SUi encodes three messages and decodes two messages,
each joining node performs 5*O(1) messages’ encoding
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FIGURE 6. The results of executing the proposed authentication mechanism at CH level in the scyther
environment.
and decoding. Thus, the computation overhead for each
node is ≈ O(1). On the other hand, the authenticating party
encodes 2*|M| and decodes 3*|M| messages, where M rep-
resents the total number of SUs. Therefore, the computa-
tion overhead at the authenticating party is (2*|M|+3*|M|).
If we replace M by N for complexity calculation stan-
dards, the computation overhead at the authenticating party
is ≈ O(N). The communication overhead is calculated based
on the number of messages exchanged between the joining
node and the authenticating party. The number of messages
is equal to that used in the computation overhead; therefore,
the communication overhead at the joining SU is≈ O(1) and
at the authenticating party is ≈ O(N).
B. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we compare our proposed authentication
scheme with the approaches described in [19] and [20]. This
comparison is in terms of the number of cryptographic oper-
ations needed by each technique and the total authentica-
tion time. We use the benchmarks available in [24] where
C++ is used to implement the cryptographic algorithms,
and Microsoft Visual C++ 2005 SP1 is the compiler and
the system specifications are an Intel Core 2 1.83 GHz pro-
cessor under Windows Vista in 32-bit mode. We select a
cryptographic algorithm for each cryptographic operation as
in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Cryptographic algorithms.
By analyzing the authentication techniques proposed
in [19], in [20] and our proposed scheme and using the
benchmarks in [24], we can determine how many times each
cryptographic operation is executed in total, as shown in
Table 3. Moreover, we use the values in Table 2 and Table 3
to compute the time needed to complete the authentication
process in each approach.
To complete the authentication schemes proposed
in [19 and [20], twenty-nine and thirty-nine cryptographic
operations have to be executed respectively. However, in our
proposed scheme only twenty-four operations are required,
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TABLE 3. Cryptographic operation count.
which means more than 10% less computation and calcula-
tion cost.
We next analyze the time needed to complete the authen-
tication process, which is referred to as the authentication
delay. It consists of two parts, the processing time and the
transmission time. The processing time is the major part
which represents the time needed to execute the crypto-
graphic operations. The transmission time is the time needed
to transmit each message between the authenticating node
and the joining node. It was assumed that the transmission
time was the same value in both schemes; therefore, the trans-
mission time was omitted in the calculation of the authenti-
cation delay.
According to [24], the signature generation time is 1.48ms,
the verification time using RSA 1024 is 0.07ms, the time for
the message encryption with public key is 0.08ms, the time
for the message decryption with public key is 1.46ms,
the time for the message encryption with symmetric key
is 1.8µs, the time for the message decryption with symmetric
key is 1.8µs, and the hashing time using HMAC (SHA-1)
is 0.509µs. The authentication time in [19] was 17.3ms and
in [20] was 8.02ms. It is approximately 7.32ms in our pro-
posed authentication scheme, which is about 57% and 9%
faster in comparison to that in [19] and [20], respectively.
Therefore, it is evident that our proposed scheme reduces
the authentication time. Moreover, our proposed approach is
less complex in comparison to that of [19] and [20]’s; since,
the symmetric key cryptography is used for encrypting and
decrypting most of the message exchanged. Symmetric key
cryptography has less memory occupation, less memory use,
and less power utilization.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cognitive radio is considered a promising technology to
solve the spectrum scarcity problem. The CR nodes are more
exposed to security vulnerabilities and threats because of their
wireless nature. Secure communication is one of the most
challenging tasks in CRNs. A CR node cannot access the
spectrum unless it has been authenticated by a reliable node.
In this paper, we propose a two-level secure authentication
scheme in CRN wherein the authenticating node and the
joining node accept a key agreement. We use the advantages
of using the public key and the symmetric key cryptography
to secure the messages exchanged between the communi-
cating nodes. During the authentication process and after a
symmetric key is shared between the communicating nodes,
any communication will be carried out using the symmetric
key cryptography.
The proposed authentication scheme, in comparison to the
existing approaches, reduces the number of cryptographic
operations and the authentication time needed to complete
the authentication process. Moreover, the correctness of the
proposed approach has been verified using the BAN logic
and through the Scyther verification tool. We verified that our
authentication approach is safe against many attacks.
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